We examine implications of delegating delivery of an infrastructure service to an elected local government rather than bureaucrats appointed by a central government. The latter is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations. Bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers, resulting in underprovision of services, especially for the poor. Local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites. Effects of decentralization on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analyzed under different financing arrangements for local governments.
problems in either centralized or decentralized regimes as arising from agency problems intrinsic to either regime.
In either system we assume that service delivery has to be delegated by the central government, either to a bureaucracy or to local governments. 5 In the case of the bureaucratic system the source of the accountability problem is that the actions of bureaucrats cannot be monitored by the central government that appoints them. This owes to high costs of communication between local areas and the central government, and difficulty faced by the central government in carrying out audits of actual service delivery patterns in local areas. 6 The bureaucrats are thus able to extract bribes from customers in their role as monopoly providers of an essential service. The centralized system ends up differentiating services to different categories of customers based on their willingness to pay bribes, resulting in nonuniform delivery patterns. However, the bureaucrats are unable to engage in perfect bribe discrimination, so the centralized system gives rise to monopoly distortions, resulting in loss of efficiency and equity. These distortions are further magnified if bribes percolate upward through multiple hierarchical layers in the bureaucracy.
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fees for an anti-poverty program, whereas it is feasible in the context of an infrastructural or farm input service.
5 From the standpoint of traditional fiscal federalism this may be viewed not as a choice between centralization and decentralization, but between two modes of federalism: bureaucratic and political. This is partly a semantic issue; we have no major quibble with such a characterization. However we believe that the policy trends in many developing countries described at the beginning of this paper do correspond to such a choice. And the two alternatives represent varying degrees of decentralization of monitoring and evaluation of the agents delegated responsibility over service delivery.
Decentralization shifts control rights over service distribution to a local government subject to electoral pressure from residents. The outcome of this is represented by policies that maximize a weighted sum of welfares of different classes of citizens. There are two classes of local users: large and small, where large users value the service more. Large users constitute a local elite commanding a higher political welfare weight, representing their superior capacity to form a special interest group (in the manner represented in capture models of Baron (1994) , Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a) ). We impose no particular restriction on the extent of such capture, and treat it as an exogenous parameter summarizing the effect of socio-economic inequality and political tradition within each community.
The local government procures the service from a public utility and distributes it among users. This is in contrast to the bureaucratic mechanism where the same bureaucracy is in charge of managing both the utility producing the service, and its distribution across and within communities.
Both activities are financed directly by the central government. Under decentralization we study three different financing mechanisms for local governments, differing in the degree of autonomy over revenue raising. The first involves complete fiscal autonomy: local governments can impose and collect local taxes. The second restricts local governments to fund the service entirely from user fees instead of taxes. In the third alternative local governments cannot raise any local revenues, so service delivery is entirely financed by fiscal grants from the central government. In the latter context, the grants are endogenously determined by a mechanism designed by the central government, based on reports from local governments concerning local need or cost shocks. The objectives of central government officials are derived from the electoral compulsions they operate under (e.g., welfare
weights they assign different classes of citizens), and the financing opportunities available to them for collecting taxes.
In this context we examine the impact of decentralization on delivery patterns (price and quantity of services delivered to different user groups, responsiveness to local need or cost shocks) and resulting welfare implications (e.g., on aggregate social surplus, and on relative welfares of rich and poor citizens). It is worth reiterating that our analysis does not assume anything about the relative corruptibility of bureaucrats and local governments, and takes this to be an exogenous parameter (in addition to other parameters such as demographic composition of different communities, the financing pattern, and cost and need patterns).
Our principal results are summarized as follows. First, in the case of local governments financed entirely by local taxes, there is an expansion of service levels to all categories of users relative to centralization. This owes to the elimination of monopoly distortions result from bribe-seeking by central bureaucrats. However, since local governments are prone to capture by local elites, they tend to overprovide and undercharge the service to them. Poor users bear a disproportionate share of local service costs. The extent of this regressive cross-subsidy depends on the extent of capture of the local government. The welfare impact of decentralization in this case therefore depends on the extent of such capture: decentralization generates higher (resp. lower) welfare (in terms of either total surplus or equity) if and only if the extent of capture is low (resp. high).
We next consider the case of local governments that are restricted to fund the service from user fees rather than taxes. The voluntariness inherent in user fee financing restricts the capacity of local governments to extract resources from the poor. This reduces the extent of the regressive crosssubsidy and service overprovision to the rich. In terms of both efficiency and equity, the outcome thus dominates the case of tax financing. Compared with centralization, the outcome still involves higher service volumes for both categories of users. Moreover, the outcome is Pareto superior (from the citizen point of view), irrespective of the extent of local capture. However all the welfare gains accrue to the rich, as the poor are left just as well off as under centralization. Under centralization all their surplus was extracted by corrupt bureaucrats; under decentralization it is extracted by local governments for the benefit of the local rich. The main impact of the decentralization is to transfer surplus from the bureaucrats to rich citizens, with an accompanying easing of monopoly distortions (which causes service levels to expand). This obtains irrespective of the precise degree of political capture.
We finally consider case of services funded by fiscal grants. The determination of these grants raises a host of additional considerations concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations. Local governments are always motivated to overstate local need to the central government. Given the inability of the central government to directly observe these shocks, incentive compatibility constraints in centre-local relations cause grants to be unresponsive to local need shocks. As a consequence local governments operate under financial constraints, causing service levels to be lower compared with either tax or user fee financing. This is the main disadvantage of grant financing relative to tax financing or user fees. At the same time the financial constraint on local governments implies that services provided to local elites comes (on the margin) at the expense of alternative services, instead of being funded by higher levies on the poor. This limits the incentive of local governments to over-provide the service to the elites. Grant financing thus results in a superior intracommunity targeting pattern, relative to local tax finance or user fee mechanisms. In terms of overall welfare impact this has to be traded off against the lower flexibility of service levels to local need shocks.
The resulting welfare comparison with other modes of financing or with centralization ultimately depends on various parameters.
In summary, the effects of decentralization on service volumes and welfare depend on the precise financing mechanism that accompanies decentralization. The expansion of service levels is greater, the larger the extent of financing autonomy granted to local governments. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Estache and Sinha (1995) who study 20 countries over the period 1970-92.
They found a significant positive effect of expenditure decentralization on per capita infrastructure deliveries, and that the expansion is weaker when local governments rely more on central funds rather than their own revenues. Our model suggests, however, that it would be a mistake to infer from this that greater devolution of financing authority to local governments is desirable from a welfare standpoint. The desirability of devolution of financing authority depends on the extent of capture of local governments. When capture is severe, decentralization runs the risk of worsening the lot of the poor. In particular, it is a mistake to identify service volume expansion as an index of welfare impact, since service volumes expand more when there is greater capture.
It is equally misleading to use bribes as a measure of corruption or welfare. The bribes associated with the centralized bureaucracy disappear under decentralization. But they are replaced by regressive cross-subsidies hidden in government finances, especially when the underpayment of taxes by the rich takes the form of tax evasion. From this perspective, cross-country studies of bribes and degree of expenditure decentralization (such as Fisman and Gatti (1999) ) provide little indication of the true welfare impact. 8 They indicate the impact on a purely economic measure of corruption, while ignoring political forms of corruption that may be equally important.
As mentioned previously, the issue of corruption and lack of accountability has largely been ignored by previous literature on fiscal decentralization, with the sole exceptions of Seabright (1996) and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (1999) . They focus on lack of accountability as the principal drawback of centralization, which has to be traded off against interjurisdictional coordination problems inherent in decentralization. In contrast, our theory based on the view that centralized systems may be more or less accountable than local governments, depending on the nature of political institutions.
The basis for this view has been argued by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a) . Concern has frequently been expressed in many developing countries regarding the possible danger of worsened intracommunity allocations under decentralization owing to capture of local governments. At the same time our model focuses less on problems of interjurisdictional coordination.
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Our result concerning the value of constraining financing options of local governments carries some resemblance to the arguments of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) concerning the need to impose constitutional constraints on Leviathan-like governments. Yet there are many significant differences between our respective approaches and results. First, Brennan and Buchanan adopt the Leviathan assumption universally, wherein all governments are depicted as seeking to maximize surplus of revenues over public good supply for their own benefit. In contrast we derive objectives of decision makers from underlying information and control structures in either system. In our model Leviathan is an apt characterization of bureaucrats in the centralized regime, but not of local governments in the decentralized system. The difference arises from the role of political competition in the latter.
The main argument in favor of decentralization is precisely that it limits the Leviathan tendency of centralized bureaucrats. 10 The problem with local governments is not their Leviathanism but 9 For instance there are no capacity constraints on service delivery across different communities. We also abstract from the possibility that local governments may possess less administrative or technical competence relative to central bureaucrats. Our model does however accommodate economies of scale in service provision across communities, which motivates production to be concentrated in a single utility from which local governments procure the service. It also allows for fiscal externalities across jurisdictions, i.e., the tendency for local communities to free-ride off revenues raised by the central government in the grant-financed system.
10 In contrast, the arguments made by Brennan and Buchanan in favor of fiscal decentralization stem from the Tiebout-like competitive pressures operating on local governments when citizens can move costlessly from one jurisdiction to another (a phenomenon we abstract from on the grounds of limited relevance, especially in developing countries). Moreover, Brennan and Buchanan assert the tradeoffs between such gains in government accountability favouritism with regard to one category of citizens. Moreover, our result concerning the superiority of decentralization under appropriate restrictions on financing authority of local governments, does not find a parallel in their work. Brennan and Buchanan lay greater emphasis instead on the need to constrain financing options of governments at the central level rather than at the local level, owing to greater competitive discipline on the Leviathanite tendencies allowed by citizen mobility across jurisdfictions.
Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 describes the centralized regime, and Section 4 the various decentralization regimes. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The service is a private benefit such as irrigation or electricity, whose production is subject to a large fixed cost F , in addition to variable costs. Production is concentrated in a single large utility Community i has N i users, who belong to either of two groups, large (l) and small (s), who differ in their valuation of the service. A fraction β i of citizens in the community are small users; the rest are large users. Large users belong to a wealthy elite, and value the service more owing to complementarities with other assets (land or factories) they own. The utility function of a member and associated costs of lack of scale economies and existence of interjurisdictional externalities. In our context the principal tradeoff is with the tendency for local governments to be captured by special interest groups.
of group k = l, s in community i is γ k η i v(y k ) − t k , where γ k is a group-specific valuation parameter satisfying γ l > γ s > 0, η i is a community-specific need shock, y k is the level of service delivered, and t k is the net financial burden imposed on the user. The utility function v is homothetic: 
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The central government knows only the demographic profile of the different communities, i.e., the populations N i and its composition among the two groups β i . It does not observe the realization of local need or cost shocks; nor can it monitor local service delivery patterns. Owing to this lack of information, it delegates control over allocation of this service between and within communities either to bureaucrats they appoint directly (the centralized regime), or to local governments (the decentralized regime).
The fixed cost F of the utility producing the service is financed by the central government out of central taxes in both regimes; accordingly we can ignore the costs of such finance when comparing the two regimes, and focus on how variable costs are financed. 12 In the centralized system variable costs are financed by a combination of user fees and subsidies financed out of central taxes. The user fees are exogenously set at a level that is insufficient to cover operating costs, necessitating a subsidy from the central government to the utility. 13 Since central government officials cannot monitor service deliveries, the budgetary support C provided by the government to the utility must be a lumpsum amount, large enough to cover its operating costs in all circumstances. Since the user fees play no role in the analysis we can set them equal to zero, without any loss of generality. 14 In the decentralized system by contrast, operating costs are funded either by local goverments out of local taxes, user fees or fiscal grants.
Central taxes involve a deadweight cost of λ > 0. Taking these deadweight costs into account, the second-best service allocation is given by solution to
The corresponding first-best allocation corresponds to the case where the deadweight costs of finance λ equals zero. The distributional burden of central taxes plays no role in the analysis except in the case where decentralization is funded by fiscal grants.
Centralized Bureaucracy
Under centralization, authority over service delivery is delegated to bureaucrats appointed by the central government. The bureaucracy consists of two layers. The top layer is in charge of the central utility and allocates services across communities, i.e., decides Y i . The bottom layer consists of a bureaucrat in each community i, who allocates Y i across users within the community. Top layer 13 See Ahluwalia (1998) for a description of chronic financial problems of state electricity boards in India, resulting primarily from low levels of user fees.
14 If l i is a constant per-unit user fee imposed on services delivered to community i, then total user fees collected i l i Y i will supplement central government revenues, thus reducing the net operating subsidy to the utility to
bureaucrats observe the realization of cost θ i for each community i, but not the local need η i . The lower level bureaucrat assigned to the community observes the realization of η i . Despite the fact that users are legally entitled to receive the service for free (or against payment of the mandated user fees), the local bureaucrat will be able to charge supplementary bribes as a precondition for service delivery. We first explain how bribes are set at the local level, and subsequently how they percolate upward to higher tiers of the bureaucracy.
Consider a local bureaucrat who controls the allocation of a given aggregate service Y i in region i among its residents. Suppose that the realization of local need and delivery cost shocks is (η i , θ i ).
The bureaucrat cannot engage in perfect price discrimination owing to his inability to identify the precise type of any given customer. Attempts to charge higher bribes to the large users that value the service more can be circumvented by these users by masquerading as a collection of small users (e.g., by splitting their lands and assets among different family members). Given absence of resale across users, the bureaucrat's problem is to select an optimal schedule of nonlinear bribes b(y), which both categories of users are subject to. Given this schedule, each user type k will decide how much service y k to procure by maximizing
Using standard methods of solving such nonlinear pricing problems (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993) ), this can be simplified as follows. Bribe and service levels for the two classes (denoted by b k and y k respectively) will be set to maximize (per capita) bribe income
that large users do not seek to masquerade as small users
Ni . Standard arguments can be employed to show that the participation constraint binds for small users, and so does the incentive constraint for large users, implying that
This generates the following reduced form expression for bribe income as a function of service delivery levels:
where
and D l ≡ γ l represent the 'virtual' valuation parameters for the two classes respectively. Maximizing bribe income (3) less variable delivery cost yields (7). Moreover, the local bureaucrat ends up with a total bribe income from this community of
In the case where the central government sets user fees for financing the service, the optimal allocation is the same as long as the user fee is less than the optimal bribe. In that case the local bureaucrat charges a bribe over and above the user fee, and the absence of income effects implies that the same solution obtains (with b s , b l now representing the total amount paid by each type of user, the sum of the user fee and the bribe). The bribe income of the bureaucrat is correspondingly reduced by the user fees they have to remit to upper levels of the government. At the margin the bribe income of the bureaucrat is unaffected, and therefore also their incentives.
Turn now to the allocation of service levels across communities by higher level bureaucrats.
These bureaucrats will seek to extract bribe kickbacks from lower level bureaucrats in exchange for allocating service levels to their respective communities. However their lack of knowledge of local need η i implies that they do not know how much bribe income (4) can be earned by a lower level bureaucrat from a given service level Y i . Hence they design a nonlinear kickback schedule
specifying the kickback they demand from a lower level bureaucrat in exchange for a given service
The optimal kickback schedule can be solved as follows. Applying the Revelation Principle, the problem can be posed as follows. The local bureaucrat makes a report η i of the local need parameter defining the bribe potential in community i. Following such a report, the required kickback and allocated service level is
The central bureaucrats select these mechanisms, one for each local bureaucrat, to maximize their own surplus, which equals the expected value of sum of budgetary slack C − F − i θ i Y i and bribe kickbacks i Q i . Hence they design the mechanism to maximize the difference between aggregate kickback and operating costs
At the same time the local bureaucrat is motivated to maximize the difference between local bribe income and the kickback that needs to be paid to their bosses. Hence the maximization (5) is subject to breakeven and truthful reporting constraints for each local bureaucrat:
Again standard techniques of solving these principal-agent problems (e.g., based on Baron-Myerson (1982) ) can be employed to show that the equilibrium intercommunity service allocation
We thus obtain the following outcome under centralization.
Proposition 1
The centralized system results in the following allocation (for any given state
resulting in underprovision relative to the first-best.
(ii) Intracommunity allocation (given the per capita service level Y i ) for community i is given by
and results in further underprovision to small users. Small users obtain a net utility of 0, while large users obtain a positive surplus, with the bribes given by (2).
Competition for rents across different layers of the bureaucracy causes the intercommunity allocation to be skewed in favor of communities with high need. Lower level bureaucrats are tempted to understate the bribe potential for their community in order to limit the kickback they have to pay their superiors. This temptation is counteracted by underproviding the service to a community when a low η i is reported. This distortion compounds the distortion resulting from inability of local bureaucrats to price discriminate perfectly. The end result is (i) underprovision of service levels to each community (relative to the first-best allocation that corresponds to a zero deadweight cost of taxes) 16 , and (ii) the intracommunity distortion whereby service delivery is underprovided to nonelites. 17 It should also be noted that the statement about surplus obtained by different categories of users in Proposition 1 does not incorporate the cost of the taxes they have paid to the central government; if these are additionally incorporated then their utilities are even lower by extent that depends on the distributional incidence of central taxes.
Decentralization
Now suppose authority over service delivery is devolved to local governments. They procure the service from the central utility, and allocate it across local users. In order to focus on considerations related to local capture (rather than the possibility of limited technical or administrative competence of local government officials that might raise costs under decentralization), we assume that they know the delivery cost θ i and procure Y i at this cost from the central utility.
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The local government may be captured by local elites owing to a variety of distortions in the functioning of local democracy. We represent the objective of the local government in community i by
where δ l i > 1 represents the premium placed on the welfare of elites relative to non-elites. The switch from centralization to decentralization shifts control rights away from bribe extractors to those who respond to the interests of local users, owing to electoral pressures. However, they respond with a bias in favor of local elites. This bias reflects inequality within the community with regard to their wealth, literacy, social status, connections, political awareness, control over media or force. Nevertheless some degree of responsiveness of local governments to the interests of small users arises from the fact that these users often form a sizeable vote block in local elections. A local government that rides roughshod over their interests may be ejected from office by disgruntled voters. Accordingly, the degree of capture may depend on β i , the demographic weight of small users within the community. We impose no particular structure on the capture coefficient δ l i , as it summarizes a multitude of political determinants of local capture that we take to be exogenous.
One particular model of electoral competition that generates an objective function exactly of the form (8) is the Baron (1994) or Grossman-Helpman (1996) theory of special interest groups that contribute to campaign finance of two parties or candidates engaging in Downsian competition for local office. This version is elaborated further in Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a) . In that version it turns out that the extent of capture δ l i is an increasing function of β i , owing to the lower level of political awareness among small users, which increases the value of campaign funds in winning elections (thus increasing the influence of elites arising from their campaign contributions).
Moreover, δ l i tends to 0 as β i tends to 0 and to a finite limit as β i tends to 1. While these assumptions are inessential to our results, the figures illustrating the service deliveries under different regimes will be drawn corresponding to such a case.
Local-Tax-Financed Decentralization
In this version expenditure decentralization is accompanied by devolution of local revenue raising authority to local governments, which are fiscally autonomous and self-sufficient. Local governments have the ability and constitutional authority to finance their expenditure needs from local taxes, at the same deadweight cost λ as the central government.
Decentralization has the advantage of exploiting the information and control possessed at the local level concerning service deliveries. On the other hand it is subject to political favouritism by elected officials towards local elites. This takes the form of preferential service deliveries and undertaxation of the large users. The undertaxation may be achieved by selectively allowing large users to evade their tax obligations, or by designing a regressive system of local taxes (e.g., based on indirect taxes rather than property taxes). A local government will set service levels and local taxes y k , t k for the two classes k = p, l to maximize
subject to the budget constraint
, and nonnegativity constraints on t l , t s .
19 Voluntary participation constraints do not need to be imposed, as local governments have the ability to impose coercive taxes, and citizens are assumed unable to move across districts owing to high mobility costs. The resulting outcome is described below, and the resulting welfare compared with centralization.
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Proposition 2 Consider any state η i such that
Then local-tax-financed decentralization generates the following outcomes:
, and service deliveries satisfying
19 The nonnegativity constraints prevent elites from using the local fiscal mechanism to directly capture the wealth of non-elites. Such forms of redistribution would typically be illegal. Hence reverse redistribution must be carried out indirectly in the form of distorted patterns of service delivery and selective tax evasion by elites, rather than direct transfers. If some degree of direct transfers is admitted, the outcome would be less equitable than represented below, but would not affect service levels. Consequently this version of decentralization would perform worse relative to the other two financing variants, further reinforcing our results concerning their relative ranking.
i.e., second-best supply to small users and overprovision to large users, implying that service levels are larger than under centralization for both groups;
(ii) higher welfare than centralization as δ l i approaches 1;
(iii) lower welfare than centralization if δ l i is sufficiently large.
Assumption (10) enables us to control for the aggregate service level to the community, and focus on differences in intracommunity allocations between centralization and decentralization. Inspecting the objective function (9) of the local government, it is evident that small users will bear the entire financial burden of the service, as local elites use their political clout to evade all tax obligations.
Incorporating this financing pattern, the objective of the local governments can be expressed as a function only of the service deliveries:
from which result (i) follows. Decentralization is thus characterized by a regressive pattern of crosssubsidization: non-elites pay for their service as well as of the elites. Moreover, elites tend to be overprovided the service (relative to second-best cost). The greater the capture of local government the more extreme these misallocations, with lower efficiency and equity. On the other hand, with sufficiently low capture the local government maximizes welfare, so the allocation approaches the second-best. Hence the welfare comparison with centralization depends upon the extent of local capture.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the degree of capture, note that that our model predicts that decentralization expands the volume of infrastructural service delivered (assuming (10) 
User Fee Financing
In practice, local governments in many developing countries lack elastic revenue bases, especially with respect to middle and low income citizens. They may also lack the constitutional authority or administrative capacity to levy and collect local taxes. Local services correspondingly tend to be financed by fiscal grants from the center, whence local governments are no longer self-sufficient, creating a host of problems (such as asymmetric information about local need, 'soft' budget constraints, and dependence of service levels on the vagaries of public finances of the central government) that will be studied in the next section. An intermediate solution involves local governments financing services by levying user charges, an approach commanding increasing attention in developing countries for infrastructure services. The virtues frequently commended for this approach are that they enhance fiscal autonomy of local governments, thus minimizing the problems described above. Less attention has been devoted to the implications for intracommunity allocations, to which we now turn.
The key feature of user fee financing (in contrast to local taxes) is their noncoercive character: fees are paid on the basis of voluntary purchase decisions by users. This has two important consequences.
First, the government does not need a specialized administration to collect local taxes, limiting deadweight costs. Indeed, we shall assume that these are zero for collection of user fees: this is inessential to the arguments below, which will continue to apply as long as they do not exceed the deadweight costs of central tax revenues.
22
Second, every citizen has the option of foregoing the service if the fee is excessive, limiting the surplus that local governments can extract from them. Large users can of course still use their political power to evade paying fees for the services they consume. But the voluntary participation constraint for small users restricts the extent of feasible cross-subsidization. Formally, the optimization problem faced by the local government in the tax financed regime is subject to the participation constraint:
Proposition 3 (i) Service and fees set by local governments under user-fee-financed decentralization are as follows:
. Compared with centralization, service deliveries are larger for both groups. Compared with local-tax-financed decentralization, service deliveries are higher for small users, while the comparison is ambiguous for large users.
(ii) User-fee-financed decentralization (weakly) Pareto dominates centralization: small users are 22 Note that the efficiency costs of user fees in terms of inducing over or under-use of the service are already incorporated in the analysis below, so the deadweight costs in the user fee mechanism involve only collection costs.
These are likely to be much lower than administration and collection of direct taxes, which requires valuation of local properties and monitoring taxable activities of local citizens.
equally well off while large users are better off. It welfare-dominates local-tax-financed decentralization, i.e., with respect to both efficiency and equity.
The reasoning is straightforward. Consider the problem of maximizing the local government objective function (9) subject to (13) and the budget constraint
. The fee t s for small users will be set at a level which reduces their surplus to zero, while providing them the first-best service level. The financial surplus generated thereby will be used to fund provision of the service to the large users. It pays for a service levelŷ l for large users. This will be the service actually delivered to large users, if it exceeds the first-best level y f l . Otherwise the latter will pay the supplemental amount necessary to raise their service to the first-best level.
To prove (ii), consider first the welfare comparison with centralization. It will be simpler to ignore the cost of taxes paid by users in the centralized system; once they are incorporated the welfare of users in that system will become even lower, further reinforcing our conclusion. Small users are exactly as well off, since in either system they receive zero surplus. And large users are better off: this is obvious whenŷ l ≥ y f l , since they receive a larger service and pay nothing. In the other case they receive the first-best service level, the same as in centralization, and they pay less.
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Next consider the comparison with decentralization financed by local taxes. Here it helps to focus on the case where collection of user fees involves the same deadweight cost λ as local taxes.
Small users will get the same (second-best) service level under both systems of financing, since they involve the same burden and allocation of cost. We claim that service provision to large users will either be the same or higher under tax financing. It will obviously be the same in the case where the participation constraint for small users does not bind in the tax financing solution. On the other hand if the participation constraint binds, small users must be paying more under tax financing (since they receive the same service level under both systems), which funds a larger service to large users, as claimed above. Since the latter receive second-best supply or greater under user-fee financing, the service must be over-provided to large users under tax-financing. Therefore tax-financing is both less efficient and less equitable. To complete the argument, note that if the collection of user fees involves lower deadweight costs compared to local taxes, the relative performance of the user-fee mechanism improves even further.
A user-fee system administered by a local government subject to local capture thus continues to overprovide the service to the large users at the expense of the small users. But the extent is lower compared with the case of local tax finance. Service levels under the scheme are illustrated in Figure   2 . Supply to small users expands uniformly from second-best to first-best because of the reduction in deadweight costs of collection. The same is true for large users in regions with negligible (β i close to 0) small users: supply levels expand from the second-best to the first-best level. In such regions there is an expansion of service deliveries to both groups, compared with the case of tax-financing.
For regions with higher fraction of small users, there can be over-provision to large users, but to a lesser extent under user-fee financing. Hence aggregate service level to communities can shrink as a result of the restriction on the revenue raising capacity of local governments. From a welfare standpoint, however, this is a blessing -it reflects a mitigation of the damaging efficiency and equity effects of local capture.
This explains the welfare ranking of user-fee-financed decentralization relative to local tax finance or centralization. The generality of this result is striking: it holds irrespective of the degree of local capture, the composition of the district, or the realization of local need and cost shocks. Of course there are a number of qualifications: it rests on some of the maintained assumptions of the model, such as absence of need to incorporate inter-regional spillovers or redistribution, and adequate capacity of local governments to ensure cost-effective procurement. The argument also utilized the assumption of only two classes of users; we have not checked whether it survives when there are more than two classes. Despite these qualifications, the result illustrates a number of advantages of user fees: lower collection costs, and limited scope for discretionary cross-subsidization by captured local governments to favor local elites. User fees selected by local governments with purchase decisions subsequently decentralized to individual users permit flexibility of service provision with respect to local cost and need. It is not, however, an optimal mechanism, since it permits some degree of cross-subsidization and overprovision to large users. This motivates interest in alternative financing mechanisms that restrict discretion of local governments in other ways.
Central Grant Financing
We now consider the third financing mode for local governments: grants from the central government.
Suppose that local governments have no revenue raising capabilities at all, and receive block grants from the center to fund infrastructural service allocations. Note that the local government would always prefer a larger grant to a smaller one. This will give rise to an incentive problem between central and local governments: the latter would always like to overstate local need and cost in order to be eligible for a larger grant. Lacking information about local conditions, and being unable to monitor service deliveries actually implemented by local governments, the center will be unable to verify the claims made by local governments. Consequently grants will end up being insensitive to local conditions. The insensitivity of central grants to local conditions implies that first-best or second-best al-locations cannot be implemented, even if all other conditions were ideal (e.g., if local governments were not subject to elite capture). Nevertheless, some flexibility is possible if the grants are not tied to specific categories of services: local governments can then allocate a given budget across different services in response to shifts in relative local needs or costs. Even tied grants admit considerable de facto fungibility, allowing them to be spent on alternative services via creative accounting practices.
In particular they can be diverted to alternative programs that happen to be favored by local elites.
To represent such flexibility in its simplest form, we assume that governments allocate their fiscal resources between the infrastructure service in question, and lump sum subsidies to either class of users (representing the pecuniary equivalent of alternative services delivered). Since there is scope for discretion with respect to whom the alternative services are delivered, we assume that the local government can discriminate perfectly across the users in their allocation.
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Given a fixed (per capita) block grant G, the local government in region i will select an allocation of the given infrastructure service y s , y l and subsidy equivalents S s , S l for alternative services for the 24 The results below will not be qualitatively altered with alternative specifications, e.g., if the alternative services are allocated uniformly across both classes, or if marginal utility of users are diminishing with respect to the level of their supply.
two classes of users to maximize
and the nonnegativity constraints S s ≥ 0, S l ≥ 0 that arise from the lack of local revenue raising capacity. Given local capture it is immediately evident that small users will receive no alternative services at all: S s = 0. Hence grant income not spent on the infrastructural service will be diverted to the procurement of alternative services that selectively benefit local elites.
Since the budget constraint (16) must bind, it follows that
spending more resources on the assigned service means less is available for diversion to the alternative service.
In contrast to the two previous financing modes, therefore, the cost of service delivery at the margin is effectively borne by large rather than small users. This implies a different pattern of service allocation from the two previous regimes. The problem of the local government reduces to maximization of
If the grant G is large enough, this constraint will not bite, and the service allocations will satisfy the first order condition
Large users then get delivered the first-best level, while there is under-provision to small users. This closer to the pattern under centralization, rather than the other financing modes of decentralization.
The implications of a given block grant G on community allocation is described next.
Proposition 4
The allocation resulting from a block grant G in community i is the following:
. In this case spending on the service is less than the grant G, with the surplus diverted to elite consumption (S l > 0). When need exceeds η * i , the local government is financially constrained, spending it entirely on the service, so
, and there is no diversion.
The per capita service delivery pattern is
This restriction in the flexibility of service levels to local conditions in high need states is a distinctive feature of grant-financed decentralization. It is an outcome of the informational constraints facing central governments while designing fiscal grants, and the incentive of each local government to free-ride off a common revenue pool at the expense of other communities. The severity of these fiscal constraints depends on how large the grant is. We therefore turn to the question of how these grants are determined.
This depends on the political objectives of the central government, and the way that they fund the grants. The central government may also be subject to capture by elites, to an extent that may 26 This is given by η
. bear no obvious relation to the extent of local capture (as argued in Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a) ). So letting δ c denote the degree of capture at the central level, the objective of the central government is
As for financing patterns, it is well known that for a variety of reasons, both including political will and administrative ease, most developing countries rely primarily on indirect (sales, excise and customs duties) rather than direct taxes. 27 Owing to their regressive nature, we shall assume that small users bear a burden that is proportionately greater or the same as the burden borne by large users. Let 1 − ψ ∈ (0, 1) denote the asymmetry in tax burden, i.e., if ψ = 0 the burden falls exclusively on small users, whereas it is shared evenly if ψ = 1. Then the objective of the central government as a function of the grant allocation G 1 , G 2 , . . . to different communities reduces to
This can be expressed as the sum of separate objective functions for different regions:
where the objective function corresponding to community i is a function of the grant to that community alone:
The community grant G i will be selected to maximize (23). In making this decision, the central government incorporates its expectations of how local governments will allocate any given grant level within their respective communities.
The analysis of optimal community grants is somewhat complicated, and so we omit some of the technical steps (which are available in the working paper version of this paper Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000c) ). The overall implications are summarized below.
Proposition 5 With decentralization financed entirely by central grants:
(a) Region i will be financially constrained with positive probability if
In this case, region i will be financially constrained if and only if local need shock η i exceeds the threshold η * i .
(b) In low need states where region i is not financially constrained, large users are provided firstbest service levels (besides the benefits of diverted funds), while small users are underprovided relative to the first-best to an extent depending on local capture. In financially constrained states, service levels are the same as at the threshold state η Note the importance of financing constraints faced by the central government, represented by λ. Even with perfectly accountable governments, financing constraints at the central level will lead to service underprovision with grant financing, unlike decentralization based on user fees. As λ rises, service levels will progressively shrink as central grants dry up. For λ sufficiently large, service levels will decline precipitously, causing performance to drop below centralization as well. At the other extreme, if collection at the center is efficient and λ is close to zero, and governments are sufficiently accountable at both levels, the outcome of grant-financed decentralization will approach the first-best.
In particular, note that grant-financing may be dominated by user-fee financing under appropriate conditions (e.g., λ sufficiently large), while under others grant financing may be more or almost as efficient than user fees. To gain further insight into the relevant trade-offs, we compare the resulting patterns of service deliveries with centralization and user-fee-financed decentralization. These are depicted in Figures (3) through (6). Figure 3 compares deliveries with those under centralization for regions where β i < β * 1 , where the threshold β * 1 is defined by the condition δ
i.e., service undeprovision to small users is the same as in centralization. In low β i regions, grant financing expands supplies to small users in low need states where the local government is not financially constrained, while supplies to large users is unaffected. But in high-need states where local financing constraints bind, service levels may shrink for both groups as a result of transition to grant financed decentralization. The overall effect on service levels and efficiency thus depends on the severity of the local financing constraints, as explained above. One apparent benefit of decentralization in these regions is that it improves equity in service levels (in low need states). This may however not be mirrored in a genuine improvement in equity since small users may ultimately bear a greater financial burden under decentralization (e.g., if they bear a disproportionate share of the burden of central taxes).
On the other hand in regions where the fraction of small users β i is larger (depicted in Figure   4 ), service allocations to small users shrink under decentralization even when local governments are financially constrained, resulting in a less equitable outcome. In this case, service levels shrink for both classes of users (except large users in low need states, who receive the same service). Here grant-financed decentralization hurts growth, efficiency as well as equity. Indeed, it may be Paretoinferior to centralization: large users may be worse off even if they bear a negligible fraction of the burden of central taxes, as a consequence of shrinking central grants that dry up service deliveries.
This is a case where transition to decentralization will cause both categories of users to regret the absence of the corruption which 'lubricated' the centralized system in the past!
We turn finally to the comparison with user-fee financed decentralization, which we have shown above dominated local-tax-financing. Note that user-fee financing generates efficient provision of the service if and only if β i is small enough, whence the burden of financing over-provision on small users tends to be excessive. For instance in the case where α, the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, lies between 0 and −1, the relevant threshold β * 2 is defined by the condition for these two cases respectively. It therefore follows that in all cases, grant financing shrinks service levels to both categories of users relative to user-fee financing, with the exception of large users in low β i regions when their local governments are not financially constrained. Hence the effect of not devolving revenue raising powers to local goverments in step with their expenditure responsibilities causes an unambiguous reduction in the level of services in all regions, irrespective of patterns of political accountability. This is again consistent with the empirical results of Estache and Sinha (1995) . The reduction in service levels may however be efficiency enhancing, as they constrain the tendency for large users to be overprovided under user-fee financing. Since such overprovision is paid for by the small users, it may improve local equity as well. The problem with grant-financing on the other hand is the tendency for small users to be under-served if local governments are susceptible to capture, or both categories to get under-served in high-need states when financing constraints bind.
The severity of the latter problems depend respectively on the extent of local capture, and on the costs of raising central taxes. If they are not very acute, grant-financing may conceivably end up dominating user-fee financing.
Concluding Comments
This paper has studied the tradeoffs between allocation distortions resulting from monopoly power of unregulated and corrupt bureaucrats in a centralized delivery system, and the tendency for local governments to be captured by local elites under decentralization. The key point is that the effects of decentralizing service delivery will depend on the method chosen for financing local governments.
Existing empirical results suggest that expenditure decentralization not accompanied by revenue decentralization limit the expansionary effect of decentralization on service levels. Our model provides an explanation for this pattern, and at the same time urges caution in inferring that greater revenue decentralization would be welfare enhancing. Local capture tends to be manifested in service overprovision to local elites, at the expense of elites, which is both inefficient and inequitable.
Accordingly restraints on the revenue-raising capability of local governments can limit the extent of such resource misallocations.
User fee financing mechanisms are particularly notable in this connection: the voluntariness of such mechanisms in contrast to the coercive character of local taxes limit the extent of regressive redistributions that elites can employ in their favor. In our model user fees ensure that decentralization generates higher efficiency and equity compared to centralization, irrespective of the extent of local capture. Compared with the more traditional form of financing, i.e., intergovernmental fiscal grants, user fees have the added advantage of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local governments. This enables service allocations to be sensitive to random fluctuations in local costs and needs, particularly when such flexibility is most useful (i.e., when local need is high). They also ensure higher service deliveries compared with grant financing, owing to the avoidance of asymmetric information, inter-community free-riding and bargaining distortions inherent in a system of intergovernmental fiscal grants. Of course user fee mechanisms have a number of shortcomings which our model abstracted from: for instance when redistribution across communities is an important objective, or if a significant proportion of intended beneficiaries do not have the means to pay for the service.
Apart from the normative results, our model also provides a number of detailed predictions concerning the impact of decentralization on service allocations and their financing, which are empirically testable. We hope that future empirical analyses of fiscal decentralization in developing countries will be carried out to test these predictions.
Our model abstracted from problems of interregional spillovers of decisions made by local governments, and possible lack of expertise at local levels. Both of these may be important in practice, and need to be evaluated independently in assessing the effects of decentralization. Spillovers might naturally arise in the areas of roads, telecommunications, schools and public health. Even in the context of water resources, spillovers will arise if there are aggregate capacity constraints that bind.
In all these cases, decentralization will require coordination of decisions made independently by different local governments, involving either central interventions, establishment of resource sharing formulae, or market-like mechanisms. Lack of managerial and technical expertise at the local level may prevent cost-effective provision of the service within regions. For instance, if local government officials are not informed about the realization of marginal costs of serving their community, managers of the central production enterprise may be able to earn rents by exploiting their specialized information, resulting in additional distortions under decentralization. Cost-effective procurement may also be vitiated if local government officials do not have much bargaining power when dealing with service providers, allowing the latter to earn monopoly rents. In the presence of either of these problems, the performance of decentralized regimes will deteriorate further.
We considered three polar modes of financing most commonly employed in developing countries (see, e.g., (Dillinger (1995) ). Mixed modes of financing may also be worth exploring in this context, e.g., where local governments rely on a mixture of local user charges and central grants, which might dominate either polar mode. We also restricted attention to unrestricted fiscal grants, which allowed some degree of flexibility in local service delivery, at the cost of allowing diversions of surplus resources to local elites in low-need states. Grants tied to expenditures on specific services restrict both flexibility in service delivery and scope for diversion of unspent funds to other less important social purposes. An intermediate form of grant finance involves matching grants tied to specific services, which combine advantages of providing some degree of flexibility in service delivery, while limiting scope for diversion. Clearly the welfare implications of a richer set of financing options than analysed in this paper deserve to be explored in future research. Finally, it may also be worthwhile to explore additional variants of decentralization such as privatization of the service delivery process (where private delivery companies are subject to a combination of central and local government regulation), or yardstick competition between different local governments. 
